| Project/Area Number |
15K03152
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Social law
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| Research Institution | Kyushu University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,510,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥810,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Keywords | leniency / cartels / compliance / civil remedies / due process / settlement / cartel / price fixing / Asian competition law / online platforms / class action / public enforcement / private enforcement / innovation / justifying leniency |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Leniency policies are implemented to facilitate the detection of cartels. In the long run, it is also hoped that the leniency policies will deter cartel formation. This research has argued that it is necessary to investigate the operation of the leniency policy in a broader policy setting to achieve a proper evaluation. The outcome of the research is that the height of the sanction is important to have an effective leniency policy. However, one needs also to look at how the private enforcement setting, the interpretation of the law by the enforcement authority, the flexibility of the rules, the capacity of the enforcement authority, the other enforcement tools (like settlement or whistle-blowing), and the corporate compliance culture.
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