Optimal Design of Evaluation Schemes in Dynamic Environments
| Project/Area Number |
15K03352
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Research Field |
Economic theory
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Osaka University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,470,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥570,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | バンディット問題 / 戦略的試行 / 情報の非対称性 / コミットメント / 非対称情報 / モラルハザード / アドバースセレクション / 最適停止問題 / パンディット問題 |
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This project explored the optimal evaluation scheme in an environment plagued by various sorts of uncertainty. We in particular conducted three projects building on the framework of multi-armed bandit problems. (1) We characterized equilibrium dynamics and derived the value of commitment when the principal must evaluates the agent's innate productivity which is revealed only gradually over time. (2) We considered an environment where the principal is privately informed about the project quality, and analyzed how the presence of private information affects the agent's effort dynamics and the overall efficiency. (3) We considered an environment where the agent can choose either a safe project or a risky project and derived the optimal subsidy scheme to encourage the agent to take the riskier but potentially more profitable approach.
|
Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(14 results)
