| Project/Area Number |
15K03436
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Hiroshima University |
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Principal Investigator |
Okamura Makoto 広島大学, 社会科学研究科, 名誉教授 (30177084)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
大川 隆夫 立命館大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10258494)
友田 康信 神戸市外国語大学, 外国語学部, 准教授 (30437280)
新海 哲哉 関西学院大学, 経済学部, 教授 (40206313)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,420,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,020,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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| Keywords | 階層的教育システム / educational standard / 入学定員 / Educational Standard / 高等教育機関の定員 / 高等教育 / 教育政策 / 人的資本 / 階層的構造 / higher education system / education policy / private school / mixed oligopoly |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We consider optimal education policy in models with hierarchical education systems. While an education system selects students based on admission standards, another education system controls education enrollments of advanced schools and students are accepted in descending order according to score of admission exams. Considering competition among students, we obtain an equivalence proposition of educational standards and enrollments if several conditions are satisfied. Moreover, we show that free-entry of advanced schools does not lead to Pareto optimality if either peer effects or asymmetric information problems exist.
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