Game analyses of the effectiveness of international agreements on environmental technology
| Project/Area Number |
15K03438
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Kyushu University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,860,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥660,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
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| Keywords | 国際環境協定 / 環境技術 / 自己拘束性 / 提携形成ゲーム |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We obatain following two results on international agreements concerning environmental technology. Firstly, we assume that the benefit from technology adoption is uncertain and that the uncertainty will be eliminated by learning in a certain period in the future. By comparing the case where the learning occurs before signatory countries make decisions on technology adoption with the case where the learning occurs after they do, we reveal that the latter case leads to socially desirable outcomes. Secondly, We model pollution abatement games between a developed country and a developing country and examine how the equilibrium changes with international technological aid. We find that under certain condition, both countries abate more with the introduction of a positive support ratio than in the base case and the total payoff increases.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(5 results)
