| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,680,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,080,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
|
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We examine optimal organizations with multiple agents under asymmetric information in a setting in which each firm's cost is comprised of not only a variable cost but also a fixed cost. We show that when a difference in the amount of fixed costs with respect to each firm's types is sufficiently large, countervailing incentives may arise. We characterize optimal collusion-proof contracts under the conditions that the supervisor can collude with the agent and that countervailing incentives will prevail.
We explore optimal contracts in a principal-agent model with multiple agents in which the principal can choose residual claimancy and a monitoring instrument and show that under the decentralized structure, the principal prefers to be a residual claimant and to choose input monitoring. In oligopolies under incomplete information, we show that the impacts of a firm's risk aversion on outputs, prices, consumer surplus and social welfare can be expressed via potentially observable variables.
|
