Policy Competition among Asymmetric Countries
| Project/Area Number |
15K03511
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Public economy
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| Research Institution | Osaka University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,380,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥780,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | 租税競争 / 非対称国家 / 内生的手番 / 税務執行 / 戦略的委任 / 非対称地域 / 教育投資 / 経済成長 / 戦略的代表選出 / 環境問題 / 公共投資 / 公的介護給付 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Using an asymmetric capital-tax competition model in which capital ownership can vary, I showed that there exists a unique degree of residential capital ownership such that the equilibrium outcome of the timing game switches from the Stackelberg to the simultaneous-move outcomes. I also developed a tax-competition model with two policy instruments: the tax rate and the tightness of tax enforcement (control of profit shifting). Comparing the equilibria of the noncooperative and cooperative enforcement choices, I pointed out two drivers that promote enforcement cooperation: complementarity (imperfect substitutability) of countries' enforcement efforts and tax leadership. I also explored the outcome of strategic delegation under transnational externalities. With sufficient complementarity of the public inputs, strategic delegation leads to the delegation to a greener politician. With sufficiently high substitutability, the only equilibria involve asymmetric provision of public inputs.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(29 results)
