| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We study incentive schemes by applying contract theory and behavioral economics. First, we examine multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible and a non-contractible tasks. There is another agent who can contribute to the non-contractible task. The agents play a signaling game: after observing an informed agent's action, an uninformed agent can choose its own action. In contrast to the previous literature, we show that a principal may provide the informed agent with a higher incentive to the contractible task in order for the agents to work more in the non-contractible task. Second, we investigate a multi-agent moral-hazard model where agents are loss averse. In the optimal contract, both high- and low-performance agents are equally rewarded if most agents accomplish their projects; otherwise only high-performance agents are rewarded.
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