| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,640,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥840,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
There was little correlation between local governments’ child welfare and education spending and the juvenile population increase. Regional policies designed to attract families with children tend to result in neighbouring regions competing. Only the national government can cut social security for the elderly and redirect it to children.
The reason France has been pro-natalist is to compete against Germany. Macron could win his presidential election despite calling for an increase in the social security surcharge tax (CSG) because the poverty rate is lower among the elderly than among younger generations. The CSG is similar to Sweden’s concept of taxable benefits (‘give everyone sufficient benefits so that everyone can pay taxes’).
In order to create a source of revenue for population decline countermeasures, public funding use must promote university education among high school graduate workers, thereby increasing university graduates, who can pay higher taxes.
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