| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,380,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥780,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
I focus on college admissions matching where there are colleges with finite capacities, and students have abilities as private information and compete for seats in colleges as the result of their effort. I modeled it as a contest game. In addition, we compare the centralized mechanism with the decentralized. I proved the existence of the unique symmetric equilibrium for both of the centralized and decentralized mechanisms. We showed that low-ability students prefer the decentralized, while high-ability students prefer the centralized. We conducted the laboratory experiment on this game and confirmed the theoretical results.
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