The Sources of Party Unity in Legislative Voting
Project/Area Number |
15K16978
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Research Field |
Politics
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Research Institution | Kobe University |
Principal Investigator |
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Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥3,770,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥870,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
|
Keywords | 政党組織 / 議員行動 / 議場投票 / 党議拘束 / agenda-setting / 日本政治 / 総理大臣 / 選挙区訪問 / 政党の一体性 / 選挙誘因 / 資源配分 / 政策位置 / 内閣総理大臣の指導力 / 票の買収 / 政党への忠誠 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This study has examined how political parties discipline members’ voting behavior while facilitating members win an election. The study argues that parties seek to achieve both party unity and members’ electoral success through electoral resource allocation to members. Using a unique dataset of party leaders’ campaign visits to candidates, the study finds that parties allocate resources to members who are ideologically more distant from the party as compensation for their electoral losses in policy areas concerning general benefits, and allocate resources to members who are ideologically closer to the party median as a reward for their ideological loyalty in policy areas concerning particularistic benefits.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(21 results)