Entry Deterrence with Exclusive Contracts: Theoretical and Experimental Studies
| Project/Area Number |
15K17060
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Kyoto Sangyo University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Research Collaborator |
SATO Misato
TAMURA Wataru
NAKAMURA Nagatomo
MATSUSHIMA Noriaki
MIYAOKA Akira
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | 経済政策 / 競争政策 / 産業組織論 / 垂直的取引制限 / 排他条件付取引 / 産業組織 / 参入阻止 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this study, we try to identify the economic environment where rational economic agents engage in exclusive dealing for anticompetitive reasons. This study consists of theoretical and experimental studies. In the theoretical studies, we find that anticompetitive exclusive contracts are singed when the downstream firm bargains with upstream firms sequentially and when the complementary input supplier with market power exists. In the experimental study, we compare three treatments, which differ in terms of the sellers' moves, and find significant differences to the incumbent seller's exclusive offer and exclusion rates whereas 100 % exclusion rate is expected for all treatments.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(25 results)
