| Project/Area Number |
15K17081
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Public economy
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| Research Institution | Soka University |
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Principal Investigator |
Masui Makoto 創価大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (50409778)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Keywords | 雇用保護 / 労働インセンティブ / 人的資本蓄積 / 非正規雇用の利用目的 / 解雇規制緩和 / 労働生産性の向上 / 正規雇用者による努力選択 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this research project, I dealt with the following three topics: (i) employers' objectives of using temporary contracts, (ii) effort choice by temporary and regular workers, (iii) provision of firm-sponsored training to temporary workers. Regarding the first subject, I numerically identified factors which induce employers to use temporary contracts as a screening device. Regarding the second subject, I theoretically showed that more stringent employment protection associated with regular jobs not only induces regular workers to shirk, but also decreases the proportion of workers in a match that the true quality of the match is revealed to be good. The latter effect leads to a reduction in the average productivity of regular jobs. Regarding the third subject, I theoretically showed that relaxing firing regulations on regular jobs contributes to an increase in the proportion of temporary workers who receive firm-provided training.
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