Reward and punishment systems to solve social dilemma: Effects of institutions and group size
Project/Area Number |
15K17251
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Research Field |
Social psychology
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Research Institution | Kagoshima University |
Principal Investigator |
Ozono Hiroki 鹿児島大学, 法文教育学域法文学系, 准教授 (50709467)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥3,510,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥810,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
|
Keywords | 協力 / 集団 / 社会的ジレンマ / 公共財 / 罰 / 制度 / リワード / 進化 / 統治 / 公共財問題 / ガバナンス |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this study, we investigated how sanction-reward and punishment- works to solve social dilemma in terms of group size and centralized institutions. As for peer reward and punishment, the results suggest that sub-grouping, that is, the situation in which the members one can sanction is limited, cause the failure of cooperation in large-scale groups. As for centralized punishment institutions, the results suggest that the second-order punishment, that is, the punishment to the member who does not support the institution, is important to maintain cooperation in large-scale society. In conclusion, this study shows that peer reward is effective in a small-scale society and centralized punishment institution is effective in a large-scale society.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(6 results)