| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,380,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥780,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
It has been argued that punishment toward norm violators sustained large-scale cooperation in human society. In this research, I investigated the relationship between the reputation of punishers and two styles of punishment; peer punishment (punishment by each group member) and pool punishment (punishment by a centralized authority or a group leader). Through a series of studies, it has been suggested that peer punishment would be stabilized better than pool punishment in the situations that each group member shared information about past behavior of group members. In the experimetnal situations in wchih information about cooperative tendencies of each group member was ambiguous, punishment by a group leader was functioning better than peer punishment. The motivation behind people chose peer punishers as an interaction partner might be related to payoff maximizing behavior rather than social preferences.
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