Analysis of Economic Behavior in Networked Markets
| Project/Area Number |
15K20838
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Otaru University of Commerce |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,120,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥720,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | 進化ゲーム理論 / ネットワーク市場形成 / 動学ゲーム理論 / ネットワーク理論 / 産業組織論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We study the evolution of pricing behavior in a networked oligopoly market, in which firms who are on vertices of a network compete with only their neighbors. The theory of industrial organization predicts that every firm charges the competitive price in a non-networked market. We show in our networked market, a collusive price is evolutionary stable under weak selection. The results suggest that collusive pricing prevails in a large market if and only if it is networked.
We also study what coalition formation behavior in a 3-person ultimatum game evolves. Traditional game theory predicts the largest and efficient coalition with a proposer exploiting most of the total value. However, our stochastic evolutionary selection favors the formation of a two-person subcoalition if and only if its coalition value exceeds a high proportion of that of the largest coalition, resulting in economic inefficiency and social exclusion.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(9 results)
