A study on the mechanism design of water quality trading auction

• Project/Area Number: 15K21116
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Environmental policy and social systems; Economic policy
• Research Institution: Kyoto University
• Principal Investigator: Ito Nobuyuki 京都大学, グローバル生存学大学院連携ユニット, 特定准教授 (30742605)
• Project Period (FY): 2015-04-01 – 2018-03-31
• Project Status: Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
• Budget Amount: ¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000); Fiscal Year 2017: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000); Fiscal Year 2016: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000); Fiscal Year 2015: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
• Keywords: 水質取引プログラム / 逆オークション / 非対称オークション / 移動係数 / 水質汚濁 / 非点源汚染 / 水質取引オークション / 汚染寄与度 / 取引比率

Outline of Final Research Achievements

The water quality trading auction is a program which tries to minimize social abatement costs of water pollutants by trading water quality credits between non-point sources and point sources. In the study, I modeled a situation in which there are heterogeneous delivery coefficients by applying an asymmetric auction model. I also addressed an empirical study using laboratory experiments on the water quality trading auctions in which a single or multiple water quality credits are traded. Although the analysis of experimental data is ongoing, I have built a fundamental framework of experimental study on the research questions.

Research Products

• [Int'l Joint Research] ペンシルバニア州立大学(米国)