| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,510,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥810,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
|
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This research analyzes determinants of institutions by using
a model in which a self-interested ruler chooses an institution that constrains his or her policy choice.
I show that inequality affects the ruler's trade-off between the expropriation of citizens' wealth and his or her hold on power. Substantial inequality among citizens makes support for the ruler inelastic with respect to his or her institutional choice. The ruler therefore chooses an extractive institution, which impedes investment and growth. These results provide an explanation for the negative relationship between inequality and growth as well as the negative relationship between inequality and institutional quality, both of which are observed in nondemocratic countries.
|
