| Project/Area Number |
15KK0089
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| Research Category |
Fund for the Promotion of Joint International Research (Fostering Joint International Research)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kobe University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Research Collaborator |
Fainlgold Eduardo イェール大学, コウルズ研究所, 准教授
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| Project Period (FY) |
2015 – 2017
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,120,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥720,000)
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| Keywords | 評判効果 / 有限記録 / 長期的関係 / 繰り返しゲーム / 不完備情報 / 不完全公的観測 / 評判 / 悪評 / ゲーム理論 / 経済理論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this research, I consider games extended product choice game. The information structure is assumed to be imperfect public monitoring. Then, I analyzed the effect of the length of short-run players' memory on reputation. When a bad type realizes with a positive probability, equilibrium payoffs for the long-run player and the short-run players are larger when the memory is finite than when the memory is infinite. When the memory is finite, reputation effect does not occur.
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