Project/Area Number |
16203011
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Economic theory
|
Research Institution | Hitotsubashi University |
Principal Investigator |
OKADA Akira Hitotsubashi University, Graduate School of Economics, professor (90152298)
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
TADENUMA Koichi Hitotsubashi University, Graduate School of Economics, professor (50227112)
FURUSAWA Taiji Hitotsubashi University, Graduate School of Economics, professor (80272095)
NISHIMURA Kazuo Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, professor (60145654)
IMAI Haruo Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, professor (10144396)
KAJII Atsushi Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, professor (80282325)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2004 – 2007
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2007)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥43,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥33,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥9,960,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥9,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥7,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,100,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥9,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥7,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,100,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥13,650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥10,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,150,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥11,310,000 (Direct Cost: ¥8,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,610,000)
|
Keywords | game theory / economic behavior / dynamic games / bargaining games / repeated games / incentive / information / environments |
Research Abstract |
This research project investigates various problems of strategic interdependence in institution, market mechanisms, organizations and human behavior as frontiers in game theory. The project consists of the following three research units. 1.Dynamic games of organizations, markets and institution The unit has developed theories of macro equilibrium dynamics and non-cooperative bargaining games. We derive conditions of dynamic systems for convergence to stationary points, indeterminacy and complex oscillation and chaos. We also present a non-cooperative bargaining model for coalition formation and payoff allocations, and define a new cooperative solution concept, called the Nash core, synthesizing the Nash bargaining solution and the core. Experiments of bargaining and public goods provision are conducted. 2. Game analysis of knowledge, information and incentive The unit has developed theories of information, incentive and repeated games. We investigate strategic effects of ambiguous information in the framework of non-Bayesian decision theory, and derive axioms of the Myerson value in cooperative games. We also prove a general folk theorem in repeated games with monitoring costs, and analyze the monopoly pricing of durable goods with network externality. 3. Applied and policy analysis of game theory The unit has developed applications of game theory to social choice, environmental problems and international economics. We investigate the possibility of social order compromising efficiency and fairness, and characteristics of individual information required for constructing social preference order. We also consider policy implications of bargaining theory to international negotiations in global warming problems. Applying network games, we analyze the formation of free trade agreements (FTA), stability of fair trade, and tariff competition. (248)
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