| Project/Area Number |
16520012
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Philosophy/Ethics
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| Research Institution | The Graduate University for Advanced Studies |
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Principal Investigator |
SHIBASAKI Fumikazu The Graduate University for Advanced Studies, Hayama Institute for Advanced Studies, Associate Professor, 葉山高等研究センター, 助教授 (90260124)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2004 – 2005
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2005)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Keywords | R.M.Hare / Language of Morals / Formalism / Fanatic / Conflict of principles / Understanding of other people / Toleration / Conflict of interests / 自由と理性 / 功利主義 / 理想主義 / 普遍化可能性テーゼ / 道徳概念 / 道徳的思想 / 記述主義 / 非記述主義 / 実質的道徳原理 / 形式主義の限界 |
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| Research Abstract |
This research is a study on the concept of morals in the former period of Hare's ethics.
In the first research year, I tried to throw light on the concept of morals in the "Language of Morals" which is one of his major writings and his paper on 'Ethics'. In the second year, I tried to make the concept of morals in his "Freedom and Reason" clear and analyze his theory of the understanding of other people.
As a result, I found that Hare's conceptualization of morals very unclear at least in his former period. But I confirmed that a germination of his theory of the understanding of other people which will be developed in his later ethics can be found in his "Freedom and Reason".
Hare points out in "Freedom and Reason" that there are two kinds of moral arguments. One is an argument which is based on a conflict between interests and the other is an argument which is based on a conflict between ideals. Hare insists that the moral arguments based on the conflict between interests are solvable by his ethical theory of universal prescriptivism. But he pleads that his theory of universal prescriptivism cannot provide a crucial resolution of the moral arguments based on the conflict between ideals. He calls up the mind of toleration in order to solve this problem. But the possible reason for this request is not given in the framework of his ethics. If we, however, look at the whole reasoning of his ethical theory we can consider that he thinks the possible grounds for the toleration are based on our competence of the understanding of other people. Hence I looked into his thesis of the understanding of other people as an attempt to interpret his conceptualization of morals.
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