| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,540,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
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| Research Abstract |
Basic Research program aims at clarifying the primitive elements in the cooperative game theory through a study of the coalition formation model. As a first attempt to extend Bloch, Ray and Vohra type analysis to extensive games, we took up sequential bargaining games and examined the patterns of coalition formation. Under linear utilities, we obtained a result that players are indifferent between forming a coalition or not, which, though sounding obvious, is not that obvious in the context of multi-person bargaining theory When we tried to extend this analysis to nonlinear utility case, then we encountered the problem of the representative bargaining (or utility misrepresentation) problem. To avoid this, we consider the case where a coalition lacking the ability to commit to a payoff redistribution. We did not get the general result yet, but for order independent equilibria of the game with CRRA utilities, we obtain that resulting coalition structure consists of coalitions with most risk averse players and possibly with one relatively least risk averse player, and the similar one after eliminating the aforementioned coalitions successively.
Besides, we finalized the investigation of the cooperative and non-cooperative analysis of bargaining problems with a time 'structure, and also on the application front, we advanced preparation for the study of the relationship between the involvement of developing countries to post-Kyoto framework for preventing climate change, and project-based mechanisms. The former result, not only extends the conventional analysis, but also opens up a possibility to investigate the effect of a coalition whose commitment ability is limited along the time dimension. The latter perspective suggest the possibility of an analysis of incentive for outsiders in a classical coalition formation problem of too mall and inefficient coalition forming, facing future uncertainty.
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