| Project/Area Number |
16530157
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Kwansei Gakuin University |
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Principal Investigator |
SHINKAI Tetsuya Kwansei Gakuin University, School of Economics, Professor, 経済学部, 教授 (40206313)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
OKAMURA Makoto Hiroshima University, Graduate School of Social Sciences, Professor, 大学院・社会科学研究科, 教授 (30177084)
TANAKA Satoru Kobe City Universities OF Foreign Studies, Dept.of Foreign Languages, Professor, 外国語学部, 教授 (20207096)
TABATA Ken Kobe City Universities OF Foreign Studies, Dept.of Foreign Languages, Lecturer, 外国語学部, 講師 (20362634)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2004 – 2005
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2005)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,900,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥1,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥1,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000)
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| Keywords | Licensing / Enforcement of intellectual property rights / Complementary technology / Litigation cost / Exhaustion of IPR / Parallel Importation / Drug Price Control / Pharmaceutical Innovation / 知的財産権の消尽 / 研究開発投資 / 知的財産の行使 / 経済厚生 / 政府の輸入価格介入 / ライセンス契約 / 特許権の執行 / Litigation cost |
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| Research Abstract |
Firstly, we examine the effect of enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) on the equilibrium outcome and welfare through licensing between duopolistic firms with patents of two complementary technologies. We explore a condition on the extent of enforcement of IPR and the litigation cost of the infringer firm under which inefficient/ efficient social surplus of monopoly/duopoly realizes.
Secondly, we construct a three country international trade game model which are composed of two (one developed and another developing) exporting countries' firms and one importing country. By dealing with licensing of developed country's firm technology with IPR, exhaustion of IPR and litigation for infringement of her IPR, we derive a sub game perfect Nash equilibrium.
Thirdly, we examine how parallel importation influences pharmaceutical innovation and the welfare of the economy, when cross national drug price differentials occur not only because of demand elasticity based factors, but governm
… More
ental drug price control based factors. By explicitly considering the governmental drug price control based factors, we show that parallel importation may enhance pharmaceutical innovation, under some conditions on the bargaining power of a foreign government and the price elasticity of demand in the foreign market. We also show that the increase in R&D induced by parallel imports may even increase the consumer surplus of a country with high demand elasticities and which could face relatively low drug prices, if parallel imports were not allowed.
Fourthly, we examine the effect of enforcement of IPR on the equilibrium outcome and welfare through unilateral and cross licensing decisions between duopolistic firms with patents of two complementary technologies. We find the conditions on both the imitation cost of the infringer and the probability of the accuser firm winning the lawsuit under that a unilateral licensing/ a cross licensing may be contracted between them, and efficient social surplus of duopoly realizes. Less
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