| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
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| Research Abstract |
1)We considers the simplest DRM, which permits either free or no copying, with incomplete information about the type of consumer. We first obtain results concerning separability of consumers in a general situation, and show that there is a critical type of consumer. A higher utility type selects a menu of free copying whereas a lower one chooses not to copy. In a two-type model we indicate that optimal pricing for a producer is different from that under two-part tariffs. This price strategy brings about greater profits and social welfare if, and only if, self production is more efficient than that of a producer.
2)Although producers seek to protect their content from copyright infringement on the Internet, it is not easy, being similar to preventing illegal parking. For such a situation, they must not only consider copyright protection, but also the effect on transaction costs from such unauthorized file-sharing. We consider whether copy control is effective in order to reduce damages to the producer's profits and to increase social welfare. Since copy control makes copying physically impossible, it decreases consumer benefits, compared with those from no copy control. We show that transaction costs of unauthorized file-sharing determine the effectiveness of copy control and obtain the conditions under which there is an incentive for a producer to introduce copy control while being compatible with an incentive from a social perspective.
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