A Comparative Study on the Collective Industrial Relations of Japanese-, Us-, and European-affiliated Companies in China
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|Allocation Type||Single-year Grants |
|Research Institution||Osaka University of Commerce |
FURUSAWA Masayuki Osaka University of Commerce, Faculty of Business Administration, Associate Professor, 総合経営学部, 助教授 (30351480)
|Project Period (FY)
2004 – 2005
Completed (Fiscal Year 2005)
|Budget Amount *help
¥2,500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,500,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥1,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,900,000)
|Keywords||trade unions / pay-for-performance / income difference issues / labor disputes and strikes / revision of Trade Union Law / 労使関係 / 工会の「労働組合化」 / マクロとミクロのギャップ / 工会法改正 / 労働協約 / 団体交渉 / 労働争議 / 「工会の労働組合化」|
The reform of employment systems in China has encouraged companies to promote the pay-for-performance-style personnel management and the mobility of the employees. Ultimately, they have led to the recent high-speed economic growth by bringing in vitalization of human resources and organizations. On the other hand, they have also induced "income difference" issues and increased labor disputes or strikes.
Facing the situation mentioned above, Chinese government (Communist Party) revised "Trade Union Law" in 2001. They are keen on stabilizing industrial relations by the articles of mandatory setups of trade unions, promotion of equal consultation system, and enhancement of collective contracts. As a result, the numbers of basic-level trade unions and collective contracts have been increasing dramatically. And according to the questionnaire survey conducted by the author (Furusawa), it has been found that the Japanese-affiliated companies are responding to the new "Trade Union Law" more pos
itively than their U.S.counterparts.
However, we can point out the following challenges of the Japanese-affiliated companies.
First, their industrial relations seem to have "given-from-the-government (party)" characteristics. For example, their collective contracts were signed due to the outside political intention, not the necessities of each company. And the proportion of companies which have the daily communication system between management and trade unions is relatively small. These represent contradictory facts against "macro-lever" prosperity of trade unions.
Second, we can not find clear-cut differentiation of the positions between management and trade unions. In many cases, the chairmen of trade unions do not work full-time, which means the managers often serve concurrently as trade union chairmen.
Third, trade unions do not function effectively enough to prevent labor disputes or strikes. And they do not seem to play active roles to solve such troubles.
Finally, we have to attend to how trade unions are going to handle their "dual responsibilities". Less
Report (3 results)
Research Products (2 results)