| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,700,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥1,400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000)
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| Research Abstract |
This is a part of my research project about the revolution in the Japanese distribution system since 1990s. In this research, I shed lights on the innovation of retail business from the viewpoints of retail mix strategies, logistics, and the structure of organization. Especially, I concentrated on the study of franchise system in the retailing sector. Royalty fees specified as percentage of retail sales (or margin) are common in franchising. Theoretical justifications for royalty fees typically rely on the optimal sharing of risk and/or the provision of a light incentive. This study takes up the incentive problem and shows that the royalty fees serve a device for the mutual coordination of activities of franchisors and franchisees. Generally, both efforts of a franchiser and a franchisee are different in character, indispensable, and complementary. This paper considers the complementary efforts of a franchiser and a franchisee. It concludes that a franchising contract with royalties can be used to attain the first-best outcome. The results of research are reported in the COE seminar at the University of Kyoto, and also in the foreign countries : European Institutes of Retailing and Service Studies, Prague,2004,Australia and New Zealand Marketing Academy Conference, Wellington,2004,34^<th> European Marketing Academy Conference, Milan,2005,32nd Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, Porto,2005.
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