| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,850,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥1,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2004: ¥1,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000)
|
|---|
| Research Abstract |
We conducted village surveys of Shandong in 2004, Liaoning in 2005, Hubei in2006 and Beijing in 2007 respectively. 3 villages were selected for research in each province. 30farmers were interviewed in each village about economic and customary behavior of many kinds of transactions. We analyzed econometrically the micro data of farmers that were collected by above mentioned way and clarified the new facts as follows.
Even nowadays, economic transaction of rural China is self-enfoceable without any judiciary third party, which is called as transaction embedded in customary way. Rural China's customary institution is characterized as socially networked nepotism based on gift giving. The generalized attributes of gift giving nepotism are characterized as follows. (1) Personally related transaction is adopted, because the close relationship can save the gift giving cost. (2) In the traditional reciprocal agriculture sector, the gifts are exchanged equally, so that the transactions are bilate
… More
ral and not related to the profits. In the stratified non-agriculture sector, the gift is presented as the signal of needed help towards high income powered man. (3) The gift giving nepotism basically supports only the supplier-demander relationship. But it also supports the efficient competition relationship among suppliers or among demanders, because the bargaining strategies using the competitive second best as threat points are adopted.
These characters are tested by the collected micro data as follows.(1) The fact that personally related transactions are still utilized in rural area is observed. (2) The gifts are exchanged among farmers and not related the profit in agricultural sector. In non-agriculture sector, however, the gift payments are used as signal and statistically significantly contributed to the profit making. (3) Even in the land rent market where the gift giving nepotism is still used, the value of marginal productivity of land is equal to rent payment, that is, the competition is actually efficient. Less
|
