Project/Area Number |
16H03120
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Social systems engineering/Safety system
|
Research Institution | The University of Tokyo |
Principal Investigator |
Toriumi Fujio 東京大学, 大学院工学系研究科(工学部), 准教授 (30377775)
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
秋山 英三 筑波大学, システム情報系, 教授 (40317300)
岡田 勇 創価大学, 経営学部, 准教授 (60323888)
山本 仁志 立正大学, 経営学部, 教授 (70328574)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2016-04-01 – 2019-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2018)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥16,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥13,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,900,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥4,420,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,020,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥5,590,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,290,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥6,890,000 (Direct Cost: ¥5,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,590,000)
|
Keywords | 社会的ジレンマ / 公共財ゲーム / マルチエージェントシミュレーション / 被験者実験 / 高次報酬懲罰系 / ソーシャルメディア / 社会システム / 計算社会科学 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We developed a theoretical approach of private assessment for analyzing social dilemmas in higher-order reward and punishment systems. We also clarified that a cooperative society would emerge when players' actions of second-order rewards were visualized even if there is no linkage between first-order and second-order rewards. This result is consistent with the results of our experiments which show that beliefs on sanctioning behaviors by the others have a positive influence on players' cooperative behaviors. Moreover, our experiment shows that the second-order punishment maintains higher cooperation than the first-order punishment.
|
Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
高次報酬懲罰系における社会的ジレンマについて,理論,実験,シミュレーションの3点からアプローチし,社会的ジレンマの性質およびその解消法について明らかにできた. 本研究結果は社会的ジレンマが存在する社会システムの構築の際に,その設計に寄与すると考えられる.たとえば,公共財としての知識共有システムの利用促進などへの応用が期待される.
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