| Budget Amount *help |
¥7,280,000 (Direct Cost: ¥5,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,680,000)
Fiscal Year 2020: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We investigated two aspects of the social preference activation by focusing on how the payoff inequality endogenously emerges. One aspect is the strategic trade-off of efficiency and equality, and the other is the strategic trade-off of risk taking and equality. In the former studies, we designed two types of 2x2 asymmetric coordination games, having two Nash equilibria (NE), one is efficient but with a big payoff difference between two players and the other is inefficient with equal payoffs. We found the social preferences activated by the disadvantageous player increases the frequency of the efficient NE, particularly when the efficient NE requires her payoff sacrifice. In the latter studies, we introduce Shur-concavity risk aversion index (SCRAI), which enables us to separate payoff risk and payoff inequality. We found that SCRAI depends on the social preferences, but not the inequality aversion type. Such difference becomes more tangible when the payoff risk involves loss.
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