| Project/Area Number |
16H06968
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Kobe University |
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Principal Investigator |
Weese Eric 神戸大学, 経済学研究科, 准教授 (50777844)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2016-08-26 – 2018-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2017)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000)
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| Keywords | Municipal mergers / Coalition formation / Integer programming / Hedonic game / Fractional games / Simulations / Municipal Mergers / Hedonic games / Moment inequalities / Markov chains / Jurisdiction formation / Maximum score |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
How should patterns of municipal mergers be decided? The recent Heisei mergers were determined voluntarily by municipalities, based on incentives offered by the national government. However, the earlier Meiji mergers were decided by central government officials. How does the merger pattern differ when decision-making is centralized rather than decentralized?
We examine the Meiji municipal mergers as they actually occurred, and assume that the central planners were attempting to choose patterns of mergers that would benefit local residents. Some areas were richer than others, however, and thus some of the centrally decided mergers resulted in richer areas having to share resources with poorer areas. Using computer simulations, we then show that if municipalities had been allowed to choose their own merger partners, the result would have been a large number of geographically bizarre mergers, as municipalities avoided poorer neighbours and merged instead with more distant partners.
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