| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This research aimed at understanding the factors which made the competitive authoritarian regimes stay in power for a long time, with an example of Venezuela's Chavista adminstrations (Chavez and his successor Maduro). They are called "competitive authoritarian regimes" because they undertake regular elections while their governing style is authoritarian. Our hypothesis is that the elections may have different functions under competitive authoritarian regimes compared to the democratic ones.
We focus on Chavista strategy to use elections as a tool to devide the opposition alliance along boycotting or participating to the elections. The elections were designed to be far from neutral and transparent, and the Chavista regimes appealed it being so instead of hiding, in an attempt to make confusion in the electoral strategy of the opposition. The strategy has been in most of the cases successful which has weakened the opposition, and thus helped the Chavista regime stay in power.
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