Factors Which Have Made the Competitive Authoritarian Regimes in South America Stay in Power
Project/Area Number |
16K02029
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Area studies
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Research Institution | Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization |
Principal Investigator |
SAKAGUCHI AKI 独立行政法人日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所, 地域研究センター, 主任調査研究員 (80450477)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2016-04-01 – 2020-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2019)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
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Keywords | 競争的権威主義 / 南米 / 地域研究 / 民主主義 / 権威主義 / 政治学 / 急進左派 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This research aimed at understanding the factors which made the competitive authoritarian regimes stay in power for a long time, with an example of Venezuela's Chavista adminstrations (Chavez and his successor Maduro). They are called "competitive authoritarian regimes" because they undertake regular elections while their governing style is authoritarian. Our hypothesis is that the elections may have different functions under competitive authoritarian regimes compared to the democratic ones. We focus on Chavista strategy to use elections as a tool to devide the opposition alliance along boycotting or participating to the elections. The elections were designed to be far from neutral and transparent, and the Chavista regimes appealed it being so instead of hiding, in an attempt to make confusion in the electoral strategy of the opposition. The strategy has been in most of the cases successful which has weakened the opposition, and thus helped the Chavista regime stay in power.
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Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
民主主義の基本原理は、選挙による為政者の選出である。しかし権威主義体制下でも選挙は実施されている。近年の比較政治学では、権威主義体制下の選挙は民主主義体制下の選挙とは異なり、体制継続に寄与するさまざまな機能をもつことが示されてきた。本研究は、それらの先行研究の知見に加え、競争的権威主義体制では選挙が反政府派を分断し弱体化させるツールとなりうるという新たな議論を提示するものである。
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(15 results)