| Project/Area Number |
16K03545
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Fukuoka University (2017-2019)
Otaru University of Commerce (2016) |
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Principal Investigator |
Kojima Naoki 福岡大学, 経済学部, 教授 (70547869)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2016-10-21 – 2020-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2019)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥390,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥90,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Keywords | Mechanism Design / Revelation Principle / Multi-dimension / Budget Constraints / Budget Constraint / Mecanism Design / Indirect Mechanims |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
I published a paper "Implementability by a Canonical Indirect Mechanism of an Optimal Two-Dimensional Direct Mechanism" in Theoretical Economics Letters 07(02), 187-192, January 2017 and "Two-Dimensional Mechanism Design and Implementability by an Indirect Mechanism" in Theoretical Economics Letters 07(06), pp1595-pp1601, October 2017.
I presented the paper "General Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents" at the Asian and Chinese meetings of the Econometric Society. I revised the paper several times and submitted it to top international journals, some of which rejected it and others requested revivions. The latest version has been submitted to the International Journal of Game Theory under the title of "Screening Contracts to Budget-Constrained Agents". The reviewers' opinions are very positive and the editor has requested a minor revision for publication.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
This research project pushed forward the existing results of the so-called mechanism design in contract theory and incentive theory in the framework of multi-dimensional private information possessed by agents.
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