| Project/Area Number |
16K03549
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kyoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
Chiba Saori 京都大学, 経済学研究科, 講師 (50770880)
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| Research Collaborator |
LIPMAN Barton
LEONG Kaiwen
SHER Chien-Yuan
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| Project Period (FY) |
2016-04-01 – 2019-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2018)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,420,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,020,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論チープトークモデル / アウトサイドオプション / 情報伝達 / 組織運営 / 利益相反 / 相関関係 / 情報構造 / 2次元利益相反 / アクションバイアス / パンダリング / ミクロ経済学ゲーム理論 / チープトーク |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We have added an element to the Crawford and Sobel (1982) (CS) model of cheap talk. Unlike in CS, an uninformed decision maker may respond to a message of an informed sender by selecting an outside option of no action, yielding state-independent reservation utilities to the players. We have shown that the outside option makes the bias two-dimensional. As a result, contrary to CS, the informativeness of communication is not always decreasing with the level of bias over actions. With a smaller bias, the expert may have a larger incentive to hide information and avoid the outside option. If we consider discrete actions and states, the outside option causes pandering incentives that the expert recommends the decision maker’s ex-ante preferred action to avoid no action. We have extended these models to argue issues such as expert selection and delegation. Besides, we have studied two-sided communications, group decision making, organizational languages, and marketing communications.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
組織運営の効率化、特に、組織内の情報を効率的に集約して意思決定に反映させることに関わる諸問題について、経済学ゲーム理論の枠組みを用いて分析した。 具体的には、アウトサイドオプション付きチープトークモデルを用い、既存研究が不十分な、アクションバイアスとアウトサイドオプションに因る利益相反が融合された状況を数値モデル化し、更に、権限の委譲、双方向の情報伝達、グループ意思決定、といった応用問題も分析し、新たな結果を示した。そして、経営者と一般社員の間の情報の流れの調整、分権化と集権化の調整、或いは、合議制と独任制の調整といった、企業経営における長年の課題の解決にも新たな知見を加えた。
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