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Designing collusion-proof kidney exchange mechanisms

Research Project

Project/Area Number 16K03567
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

Allocation TypeMulti-year Fund
Section一般
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionRyukoku University

Principal Investigator

Takuma Wakayama  龍谷大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (80448654)

Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) 星野 裕二 (藤中裕二)  関西大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (20552277)
舛田 武仁  大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 講師 (80725060)
Project Period (FY) 2016-04-01 – 2020-03-31
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2019)
Budget Amount *help
¥3,640,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥840,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Keywords経済理論 / ゲーム理論 / メカニズム・デザイン / マーケット・デザイン / マッチング / 社会的選択理論 / メカニズムデザイン / マーケットデザイン
Outline of Final Research Achievements

This project attempts to construct an “endowments-swapping-proof” kidney exchange mechanism. Endowments-swapping-proofness here states that no pair of patients manipulate the final outcome in their favor by swapping their donors (through false marriage, false adoption, and so on) prior to the operation of the chosen mechanism. We prove that when only direct exchanges among patient-donor pairs are considered, the top trading cycles mechanism is the only endowments-swapping-proof mechanism satisfying certain desirable properties. It turns out, however, that if constraints on the size of exchanges are imposed, then it is impossible to construct endowments-swapping-proof mechanisms with desirable properties. Furthermore, we conducted economic experiments to compare the performance of kidney exchange mechanisms proposed in the literature.

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

腎臓交換メカニズムを安定的に運用していくためには、偽装結婚・養子縁組などの共謀行為によるドナーの融通を未然に防止しておくという観点が重要である。これは、移植を切望する患者に、偽装結婚・養子縁組などの手段をあえて選択させる必要がなくなることから考えても重要である。そのため、本研究の成果により腎臓交換メカニズムの改善が示唆されれば、社会への大きな貢献となる。また、腎臓交換メカニズムそのものに関する実験研究がない現状を考えると、本研究を通じて、さまざまな腎臓交換メカニズムの働きが新たに解明され、貴重な基礎データの蓄積が期待できる。

Report

(5 results)
  • 2019 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2018 Research-status Report
  • 2017 Research-status Report
  • 2016 Research-status Report

Research Products

(16 results)

All 2020 2019 2018 2017 2016 Other

All Journal Article (13 results) (of which Peer Reviewed: 4 results,  Open Access: 10 results,  Acknowledgement Compliant: 3 results) Remarks (3 results)

  • [Journal Article] Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bargaining Solutions2020

    • Author(s)
      Hideki Mizukami and Takuma Wakayama
    • Journal Title

      Mathematical Social Sciences

      Volume: 104 Pages: 60-67

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.01.008

    • Related Report
      2019 Annual Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Journal Article] A strategy-proof mechanism should be announced to be strategy-proof: An experiment for the Vickrey auction2019

    • Author(s)
      Takehito Masuda, Toyotaka Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa, and Takuma Wakayama
    • Journal Title

      ISER Discussion Paper

      Volume: 1048R Pages: 1-89

    • NAID

      40022347266

    • Related Report
      2019 Annual Research Report 2018 Research-status Report
    • Open Access
  • [Journal Article] Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation2019

    • Author(s)
      Takuma Wakayama and Takehiko Yamato
    • Journal Title

      東京工業大学経営工学系ワーキングペーパー

      Volume: 2019-4 Pages: 1-45

    • Related Report
      2019 Annual Research Report
    • Open Access
  • [Journal Article] Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions2019

    • Author(s)
      Hideki Mizukami and Takuma Wakayama
    • Journal Title

      SSRN Working Paper

      Volume: - Pages: 1-18

    • DOI

      10.2139/ssrn.2041835

    • Related Report
      2018 Research-status Report
    • Open Access
  • [Journal Article] Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation2018

    • Author(s)
      Yuji Fujinaka and Takuma Wakayama
    • Journal Title

      Games and Economic Behavior

      Volume: 111 Pages: 187-202

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.004

    • Related Report
      2018 Research-status Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Journal Article] The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: An experimental comparison2018

    • Author(s)
      Tatsuki Homma, Junyi Shen, Takuma Wakayama, Hirofumi Yamamura, and Takehiko Yamato
    • Journal Title

      RIEB Discussion Paper Series

      Volume: DP2018-23 Pages: 1-40

    • Related Report
      2018 Research-status Report
    • Open Access
  • [Journal Article] Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation2018

    • Author(s)
      Yuji Fujinaka, Takuma Wakayama
    • Journal Title

      SSRN Working Paper

      Volume: - Pages: 1-50

    • Related Report
      2017 Research-status Report
    • Open Access
  • [Journal Article] Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: Characterizations and maximality-of-domains results2017

    • Author(s)
      Takuma Wakayama
    • Journal Title

      Social Choice and Welfare

      Volume: 49 Pages: 357-385

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00355-017-1068-2

    • Related Report
      2017 Research-status Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Journal Article] The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: An experimental comparison2017

    • Author(s)
      Tatsuki Homma, Takuma Wakayama, Hirofumi Yamamura, Takehiko Yamato
    • Journal Title

      Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics Working Paper

      Volume: 2017-9 Pages: 1-56

    • Related Report
      2017 Research-status Report
    • Open Access
  • [Journal Article] Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values2017

    • Author(s)
      Yuji Fujinaka, Toshiji Miyakawa
    • Journal Title

      SSRN Working Paper

      Volume: - Pages: 1-22

    • DOI

      10.2139/ssrn.3008266

    • Related Report
      2017 Research-status Report
    • Open Access
  • [Journal Article] New necessary and sufficient conditions for secure implementation2017

    • Author(s)
      Takuma Wakayama and Hideki Mizukami
    • Journal Title

      Economics Letters

      Volume: 152 Pages: 76-78

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.009

    • Related Report
      2016 Research-status Report
    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Acknowledgement Compliant
  • [Journal Article] Pre-exchange-proof house allocation2017

    • Author(s)
      Yuji Fujinaka, Takuma Wakauama
    • Journal Title

      SSRN Working Paper

      Volume: - Pages: 1-37

    • DOI

      10.2139/ssrn.2927361

    • Related Report
      2016 Research-status Report
    • Open Access / Acknowledgement Compliant
  • [Journal Article] Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: Characterizations and maximality-of-domains results2016

    • Author(s)
      Takuma Wakayama
    • Journal Title

      SSRN Working Paper

      Volume: - Pages: 1-36

    • DOI

      10.2139/ssrn.2813259

    • Related Report
      2016 Research-status Report
    • Open Access / Acknowledgement Compliant
  • [Remarks] 若山琢磨のウェブページ

    • URL

      https://sites.google.com/site/takumawakayama/home

    • Related Report
      2019 Annual Research Report
  • [Remarks] 若山琢磨のホームページ

    • URL

      https://sites.google.com/site/takumawakayama/home

    • Related Report
      2018 Research-status Report
  • [Remarks] 若山琢磨のホームページ

    • URL

      http://www.geocities.jp/takuma_wakayama/

    • Related Report
      2017 Research-status Report 2016 Research-status Report

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Published: 2016-04-21   Modified: 2021-02-19  

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