| Project/Area Number |
16K03569
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kindai University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2016-04-01 – 2020-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2019)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥390,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥90,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Keywords | 非協力交渉ゲーム / 戦略的提携 / ホールドアップ問題 / 不完備契約 / 非協力提携交渉ゲーム / フリーライダー問題 / 提携交渉 / インセンティブ / 提携交渉ゲーム / 人事の経済学 / 複数エージェント / 契約理論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
I study the relationship between the dynamics of ex-post negotiations and incentives for ex-ante investments. I adopt three player noncooperative bargaining game where the proposer is selected with equal probability after the investment decision. The proposer can choose the group alliance immediately or individual alliances where the alliances are formed sequentially. When the discount factor is sufficiently high, the alliances are formed sequentially on the equilibrium and the option of individual alliances can provide incentives for cooperative investments. When the discount factor is not high, the group alliance is formed immediately but there are two cases about incentives. When the discount factor is sufficiently small, the option of individual alliance has no effect on incentives. On the other hand, the option of individual alliances plays a role of the threat for underinvestment under the intermediate discount factor and can provide incentives.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
不完備契約の既存研究ではホールドアップ問題（過少投資）の解決策として、事前にどのようなシンプルな契約を書くことにより解決できるかといういうことに主眼を置いたものが多かった。本研究では事前に契約を工夫するというのではなく、事後的な提携交渉の仕方を柔軟にすることにより、ホールドアップ問題の解決を図るという意味で独創的である。
また、現在社会において企業提携がますますさかんに行われており、提携形成の仕方や各企の交渉力はさまざまである。現実の企業活動においても本研究が応用可能である点は社会的に意義があるといえる。
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