| Project/Area Number |
16K03695
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Public economy
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| Research Institution | Tokyo Metropolitan University (2018)
The University of Tokyo (2016-2017) |
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Principal Investigator |
HIHARA Katsuya 首都大学東京, 都市環境科学研究科, 准教授 (70526673)
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| Research Collaborator |
MAKIMOTO Naoki 筑波大学, 教授
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| Project Period (FY) |
2016-04-01 – 2019-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2018)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Keywords | 交通政策 / 契約理論 / プリンシパル・エージェント理論 / リスクシェアリング / ゲーム理論 / プリンシパルエージェント理論 / 交通経済 / 航空政策 / リスク分配 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The relationship between airlines and airports is a complex and multifaceted structure in which conflicting relationships and cooperative relationships co-exist, and is interesting from the perspective of transportation economics, contract theory, game theory, and other theories. In practice, airport slot allocation, landing charge setting are being implemented by taking such relationships into consideration.
This study seeks to extend the previous analysis to a more general context, based on prior research results about airport and airline risk sharing contracts.
During the research period, this study, based on the results so far, analyzes the conditions under which the under-effort problem is overcome by the risk sharing contract, and investigates the optimal content of the linear risk sharing contract. The results by those analyses are published as specialize academic book chapters from the perspective of contract theory and game theory.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
航空会社と空港の間の複雑で興味深い関係の好例として、能登空港の搭乗率保証契約をはじめとする異業種多主体間のリスクシェアリング契約が存在する。本研究は、こうしたリスクシェアリング契約について、契約理論、ゲーム理論、プリンシパル・エージェント理論等の観点から独自の分析を行い、最適な線形契約の内容、当事者の厚生水準の向上等の複数の学術的知見を明らかにした。また、リスクシェアリング契約は、実務上も、空港スロット配分、コンセッションにおける着陸料設定等において重要性が非常に高まっており、本研究の分析結果は、政策的、実務的にもリスクシェアリング契約の実際的な意義を明らかにする等の貢献となったと考える。
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