| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,420,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,020,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This research investigates the stable and/or sustainable formation of the international strategic alliances under transaction costs. We show that in the model of strategic R&D provision to reduce CO2 emissions,lack of trust in clubs generates transaction costs, which increase with the number of R&D collaborators. We utilize the perfectly coalition proof Nash equilibrium (PCPNE) concept to refine the set of Nash equilibria. Multilateral and hub-and-spoke coalitional structures are PCPNE, even in large economies containing all nations in the globe, in the absence of income transfers, for different values of transaction costs. With income transfers, fully participated multilateral coalitional structures are not stable; however, the size of the stable coalition increases as the economy expands.
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