| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We study some topics relating corporate governance those the changes of the institutional environment have affected over the last few decades. Firstly, we confirm that bank managers’ moral hazard would force borrowers from their banks to buy their newly issued stocks. During the financial crisis from late 1990s to early 2000s, Japanese local banks issued stocks in order to solve their non-performing loan problems. The borrowers bought these stocks fearing switching cost problem. From the point of view of relationship banking, it is not easy to for small firms to switch to new lenders because of information asymmetry problems.
The existence of switching costs enabled the banks managers issue new stock despite the issuances would not improve their banks’ firm value.In fact, the stock prices of their banks have significantly declined over two or three years when we evaluate stock price change using the Fama-French 3 factor-model.
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