A strategic approach to the bargaining problem
| Project/Area Number |
16K17082
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Yokohama National University |
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Principal Investigator |
MUTO Nozomu 横浜国立大学, 大学院国際社会科学研究院, 准教授 (40706222)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2016-04-01 – 2019-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2018)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
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| Keywords | 交渉問題 / ゲーム理論 / 交渉 / 定常性 / 経済理論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We analyze the bargaining problem applying the general "proposer-responder model," in which a player is selected as a proposer who makes an offer to the other players, and they respond yes or no. When the proposer is selected randomly according to a pre-determined distribution, we have found an example in which multiple stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes exist, and provided a sufficient condition of uniqueness. We also discussed efficiency of the equilibrium outcomes. In some cases, the efficient and inefficient equilibria co-exist. We also provided a sufficient condition of equilibrium efficiency, or that every equilibrium outcome belongs to the core.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
経済学における交渉問題とは、利害の一致しない複数の経済主体の間で、協力によりどのような状態が達成されるかを分析する問題である。労使間の給与に関する交渉、議会政治における政党間の交渉、国家間の外交交渉など、幅広い応用分野がある。このような交渉の結果を予測する上での基礎付けとして、均衡帰結の一意性は重要である。また、交渉が効率的に行えるか否かは、コース（Coase）の定理で議論されるように、応用上様々な場面で経済社会的な影響が大きい。
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(6 results)
