Policymakers' incentive and the Design of Monetary Policy Committees
| Project/Area Number |
16K17122
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Meiji University (2020)
Meisei University (2016-2019) |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2016-04-01 – 2021-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2020)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
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| Keywords | マクロ経済学 / 金融政策 / 委員会 / 政策委員会 / 協力ゲーム / 金融政策委員会 / 組織の経済学 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Focusing on the incentive structure of the actual policymakers, this program reexamines the design of monetary policy committees in a theoretical framework. The model adopted in this program incorporates the incentive caused by transparency and the carrier concern of committee members. The author explores the optimal size of the monetary policy committee and the role of the voting rules, and find the followings. When the coordination motive among the committee members is strong, smaller monetary policy committees improve social welfare. The same result holds under the median-voting rule.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
まず、金融政策委員会の意思決定を織り込んだ金融政策の理論分析は十分おこなわれておらず、マクロ経済学における本件の理論的な新規性は高い。また、委員会における透明性とキャリア形成意識という先端的なミクロ経済理論のトピックを具体例に応用し、その含意を集団的意思決定の設計という文脈で引き出している。
政策決定に関する透明性が重視される現代において、それを前提とした政策制度の設計を論じることは、学術研究が果たすべき重要な社会的貢献であると考えられる。
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Report
(6 results)
Research Products
(6 results)
