Theoretical and empirical analysis of factors which activate shareholders' meetings in publicly held corporations.
| Project/Area Number |
17530075
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Civil law
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| Research Institution | Waseda University |
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Principal Investigator |
KUBOTA Yasuhiko Faculty of Commerce, Associate, Professor, 商学学術院, 助教授 (30298096)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
OSHIKA Tomoki Faculty of Commerce, Associate, Professor, 商学学術院, 専任講師 (90329160)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2005 – 2006
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2006)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥1,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000)
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| Keywords | corporation law / shareholders' meeting / publicly held corporation |
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| Research Abstract |
This research tried to figure out the meanings and functions of annual general meetings of shareholders in publicly held corporations, through both theoretical and empirical analysis of factors which activate shareholders' meetings. To do so, we first made a database of information on annual shareholders' meetings for 16 years. And then, we empirically analyzed the economic effects of active meetings. We found that the companies with active meeting will show improved profitability, will increase information they publish, and will attract individual shareholders. In addition, we confirmed the activation of shareholders' meetings is induced not by the shareholders, but by managements who changed their mind to do so.
As a conclusion, it is now clear that the annual general meetings of shareholders in publicly held corporations have meanings, as a place where managements state their companies' philosophies and ask their shareholders to approve them, even in ordinary situations. Thus, the activations of shareholders' meetings show that the managements try to attract and maintain individual shareholders as their long-term, loyal shareholders, as well as that the managements have and perform reasonable companies' philosophies.
Also, empirical results showed that companies with active shareholders' meetings publish better managerial forecasts, and those improvements were not managed through discretional accruals. Finally we found that the stock market response positively to the improvements of managerial forecasts.
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(21 results)
