| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,180,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2007: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥1,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000)
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| Research Abstract |
The basic aim of this research was to understand in what ways and to what extent a change of political leadership can influence foreign policy making process In order to make a comparison between attitudes of different governments over basically the same foreign policy issue, we chose as a subject of study the attitudes of three successive British governments during the 1960s towards the question of possible EEC membership. The summary of conclusion is as follows :
Firstly, by examining the Macmillan Government's attitude towards EEC membership between 1959-1963, it was concluded that the role of political leadership, especially the Prime Minister's own commitment towards eventual application for EEC membership was paramount in deciding the course of British policy towards EEC before the 1st application and during the Brussels negotiations After the breakdown of membership negotiations, the Prime Minister himself apparently lost interest in this issue, but strong political guidance was
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continued to be given from Edward Heath, the minister responsible for European matters
Secondly, by examining the Douglas-Home Government's attitude towards EEC membership between 1963-1964, it was concluded that the change of leadership caused no substantial change in British policy towards EEC. The Prime Minister showed no profound interest in the issued EEC membership, seemingly resigned to the fact that the French President General de Gaulle's veto over British membership was insurmountable Instead, Douglas-Home was concerned more over the need to reinvigorate Britain's links with the Commonwealth, although it seemed to have derived more from his concern over the government's need to boost electoral support from traditional Conservative votes rather than from genuine belief in the role of Commonwealth as an important pillar of Britain's world-wide strategy. Accordingly, the EEC policy of Douglas-Home government followed basically the course laid down under the previous government, and the policy-planning for the future attitude towards EEC was mostly conducted by senior officials of the Foreign Office, the Treasury and other departments concerned.
Thirdly, by examining the Wilson Government's attitude towards EEC membership between 19641966, it was concluded that a change in political leadership did produce a profound change in Britain's policy towards EEC, at least during the initial phase of the new government Pursuit of functional co-operation on bilateral basis with special emphasis on Anglo-French collaboration in aircraft and other hi-tech industries, efforts to promote Commonwealth trade, emphasis on Britain's military commitment outside Europe, a "bridge-building" initiative for EFTA-EEC cooperation, etc. - these are all measures and initiatives which had been ruled out or had not been given serious consideration by Conservative governments during the period after the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations. The new government thought differently and tried to act differently, despite the presence of established policy consensus among major governmental departments such as the Foreign Office and the Treasury. And these were moves made at the insistence of senior members of the Cabinet, especially the Prime Minister himself. Considering the fact that the Labour government had only a fraction of majority in the Parliament, these near re-definition of British EEC policy should be regarded as a major policy change brought about by the strong influence of political leadership although these efforts all proved to be futile and the existing policy consensus among the bureaucrats came to be regarded by the Prime Minister himself as the only viable policy alternative by the time of 1966 general election. Less
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