| Project/Area Number |
17530194
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Meijo University |
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Principal Investigator |
AKAGI Hirobumi Meijo University, Faculty of Urban Science, Associate Professor, 都市情報学部, 助教授 (30254270)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
INAGAKI Hideo Yokkaichi University, Department of Economics, Professor, 経済学部, 教授 (70159937)
KAMATA Shigenori Meijo University, Faculty of Urban Science, Professor, 都市情報学部, 教授 (70214509)
MORI Toru Naogya City University, Graduate School of Economics, Professor, 大学院・経済学研究科, 教授 (60134160)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2005 – 2006
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2006)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥500,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000)
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| Keywords | NPO (Non Profit Organization) / Asymmetric Information / Service / Reputation / 非営利組織 / プリンシパル・エージェント |
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| Research Abstract |
In this research, we analyzed the market factor where the NPO and the profit organization coexist. First, we developed an analysis of the characteristic of the service market where the NPO exists. In the nursing care, the medical care, the child care and the education market, It is not easy to ascertain the quality before they purchase the services because of the characteristics of the services. it occurs the asymmetric information in the market. Especially, the service of the medical care has the speciality, the services of the nursing care and the child care have the characteristics that the request person of the service is different from the demander.
The asymmetric information after the contract occurs between the provider of the services and the demander with respect to the quality of the service. The provider who has informational advantage of the services has the motive to try to increase the profit by making quantity and the quality of the service decline. Therefore, demander have tendency they choose the NPO as the provider of the services. Because the demander thinks that the NPOs do hot have a motive to earn the profit.
But, the existence of the NPOs dose not cancel out the asymmetric information and it rather occurs another problem. We found that the for-profit firms can survive as the NPOs using the belief of the NPOs in the service market. Moreover, we paid attention to "the reputation". We assumed 3 types consumers in the theoretical model. We analyzed the condition of the market where the NPOs and the for-profit firms coexist. We found the fact that the honest NPOs which always supplies the high quality of the service, the pseudo-NPOs which supplies a low quality of the services and the for-profit firms supplies high quality of the service coexist in the service market
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