| Project/Area Number |
17530247
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | SAPPORO UNIVERSITY |
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Principal Investigator |
IIDA Takao SAPPORO UNIVERSITY, ECONOMICS, PROFESSOR, 経済学部, 教授 (00193136)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
OKAMURA Makoto HIROSHIMA UNIVERSITY, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE, PROFESSOR, 大学院・社会科学研究科, 教授 (30177084)
IZAWA Hiroshi RITSUMEIKAN UNIVERSITY, ECOMONICS, PROFESSOR, 経済学部, 教授 (70222924)
SHINKAI Tetsuya KWANSEI GAKUIN UNIVERSITY, ECONOMICS, PROFESSOR, 経済学部, 教授 (40206313)
MORI Nobuhiro NARA UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, EDUCATION, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 教育学部, 助教授 (40190996)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2005 – 2006
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2006)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥1,700,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000)
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| Keywords | CONSUMER LOAN SERVICE / OLIGOPOLSTIIC COMPETITION / FREE ENTRY EQUILIBIRIUM / EXESS ENTRY THEOREM / ASYMMETRY INFORMATION / VERTICAL STRUCTURE / SECOND BEST EFICENCY / FINANCIAL SUPPLY MARKET / 公的金融機関 / 混合寡占 / 借り入れ制約 / セカンド・ベスト / 継続的寡占 |
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| Research Abstract |
1. We assume two types of borrowers with different repayment probability. If a bank can not distinguish these borrowers (NDB), she must decide the terms of loan under incomplete information. We show that an equilibrium can exist under the appropriate values of the parameters and calculate the bank's profit in that case. We also calculate the profit under the same parameter values when the bank can distinguish two types of borrowers (DB). We find that social welfare is larger in DB than in NDB. This result suggests that banks have incentive to enter into the alliance with a non-bank.
2. We assume that the financial institutions are different in cost structure and investigate the LREq. We derive the number of firms in the long-run Cournot equilibrium and compare it with that of the second best equilibrium in which social welfare is maximized. We prove that the EET holds in the long-run even if firms have different cost structures.
3. There exists the Financial Market that the monopoly private financial institution supplies finances oligopolies consumer financial serves (CFS). The LREq is the break even point of the down stream firm. The number of CFS in LREq is less than the number of second best.
4. The monopoly public financial institution supplies finance to CFS in the down stream market. The number of CFS in the LREq is excessive.
5. Small business companies can borrow from either banks or non-banks. We show that the companies borrow from banks in equilibrium but social welfare becomes larger when borrowing from non-banks and defines a meaningful of the existing for non-banks under the welfare.
6. We analyzed problem of EET and Imperfect Information by focusing on were the Second-Best Social Welfare, Contestable Market Equilibrium and Free Entry Equilibrium.
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