Economic Analysis of Marketing and Distribution System
| Project/Area Number |
17530320
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Commerce
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| Research Institution | Kyoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
NARIU Tatsuhiko Kyoto University, Graduate School of management, Professor, 経営管理研究部, 教授 (80148296)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2005 – 2006
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2006)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000)
Fiscal Year 2006: ¥1,000,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000)
Fiscal Year 2005: ¥1,800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000)
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| Keywords | channel / price-quantity competition / Strategic Separation / franchise fee / length of distribution channel / density of retail store / vertical restraints / cost-reduction investment / 数量競争 / 流通経路 / チャネル間競争 / 戦略的代替関係 / 市場の競争性 / 卸売システム / チャネルの長さ / パネルデータ |
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| Research Abstract |
I wrote seven articles on the price-quantity competition among marketing channels. The main results are as follows : Suppose that each retailer competes in quantity, each manufacturer dose in price, and that the latter charge a franchise fee on the former. Then, each manufacturer cuts its shipping price when the market demand shifts upward, and the shipping prices become strategic substitutes. Moreover, the vertical separation of the retailers intensifies the competition among marketing channels. Furthermore, the competitiveness of the market depends on the number of retailers, as well as that of manufacturers. So, even when the number of manufacturers is small, the market is sufficiently competitive if there are many retailers.
Second, I investigate vertical separation in a duopolistic market under demand uncertainty. In the case where each manufacturer charge a franchise fee to its retailer, there exists a unique equilibrium where both manufacturers choose vertical separation. On the
… More
other hand, in the case where each manufacturer can't charge a franchise fee, if the manufacturers' products are relatively homogeneous, there exist two equilibria where both manufacturers choose vertical separation and where both manufacturers choose vertical integration. In relation to these results, we discuss the transition of Japanese distribution system from the Tatene system to the open price system in the industry of electric appliances
Third, I study the welfare effects of exclusive territories in the presence of competition among distribution channels. I demonstrate that producers imposing a franchise fee employ exclusive territories in a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and exclusive territories can enhance both the profits of distribution channels and the consumer surplus by eliminating the unnecessary transport.
Concerning to the wholesale-retail system, I wrote four articles. The transmission of information at each stage of distribution channel faces various restrictions. As various agents try to enter the channel to capitalize acquired information into the profit taking advantages of these restrictions, the distribution channel results in being long. I investigate the determination of the number of wholesale steps by using the panel data of five consumer goods wholesale industries in Japan for 30 years after 1970's I also empirically investigate the retail densities of the U.S., China and East Asia. Less
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(15 results)
