| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This study addresses two questions regarding coordinated effects of horizontal mergers. First, when should there be a major concern with coordinated effects of mergers? Through a numerical analysis of the profit increase from collusion in triopoly markets, this study shows that markets in which the collusive profit increase is durable despite cost asymmetries deserve to be prioritized. The second question relates to why mergers increase outsiders' incentives to collude. This study shows that the identity of exiting firms can inform the remaining firms in the market that they are eligible to engage in profitable collusion with tolerable cost asymmetries.
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