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Trade and Industrial Policies under intra-governmental and inter-governmental competition

Research Project

Project/Area Number 17K03734
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)

Allocation TypeMulti-year Fund
Section一般
Research Field Economic policy
Research InstitutionRitsumeikan University

Principal Investigator

Ohkawa Takao  立命館大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10258494)

Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) 林原 正之  追手門学院大学, 経済学部, 名誉教授 (00104901)
野村 良一  立命館大学, 経済学部, 教授 (60465599)
Project Period (FY) 2017-04-01 – 2020-03-31
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2019)
Budget Amount *help
¥3,640,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥840,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Keywords政府内競争 / 関税 / 補助金 / 貿易政策 / 産業政策 / サイロ効果 / 縦割り行政 / 私益 / 目的関数 / 公益 / 政府間競争
Outline of Final Research Achievements

We consider the domestic government is self-interested and compounded. It consists of a subsidy department and a tariff department. The former (The latter) non-cooperatively sets its subsidy (tariff) rate to the producer surplus (the tariff revenue). We establish: The welfare level in the non-cooperative equilibrium is higher than that in the cooperative one. We also develop a delegation game in which each department's minister delegates policy decision-making to policy-makers, and obtain: In the delegation equilibrium, both the producer surplus and tariff revenue increase, but both the consumer surplus and national welfare decline compared with the equilibrium without delegation. Furthermore, we construct the model where the government consists of the above two agencies and coordination agency, determining the degree of coordination in response to the types of the government. We establish: No coordination is desirable for both benevolent and consumer-oriented governments.

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

政府の各部門が自分の事だけ考えて行動する「サイロ(縦割り行政)」を、政府内競争と定義し、「サイロ」が解消された状況を政府内の協調と考える。一般通念では、「サイロ」を解消した方が望ましいと考えられるが、外国企業に関税をかけ、自国企業に補助金を給付している状況を前提にした場合、「サイロ」が解消されない方が望ましいということが判明した。しかも、各部門が私益を追求し、各部門にサイロの解消が委ねられた場合には、両部門が部分的に「サイロ」を解消しようとすることがありうることもわかった。両部門の調整役が、「サイロ」を解消できる場合、自国の産業保護を優先にする政府ならば、サイロを解消することもわかった。

Report

(4 results)
  • 2019 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2018 Research-status Report
  • 2017 Research-status Report
  • Research Products

    (9 results)

All 2019 2018 2017

All Journal Article (8 results) (of which Int'l Joint Research: 1 results,  Peer Reviewed: 4 results,  Open Access: 1 results) Presentation (1 results) (of which Int'l Joint Research: 1 results)

  • [Journal Article] Inter-group competition through joint marketing effort and inter-group Cournot competition2019

    • Author(s)
      A. Kawasaki, T. Ohkawa and M. Okamura
    • Journal Title

      Journal of Economics

      Volume: 印刷中 Issue: 3 Pages: 1-22

    • DOI

      10.1007/s00712-019-00654-y

    • Related Report
      2019 Annual Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Journal Article] Vertical specialization in North?South trade: Industrial relocation, wage and welfare2019

    • Author(s)
      Kurata Hiroshi、Nomura Ryoichi、Suga Nobuhito
    • Journal Title

      Review of International Economics

      Volume: 28 Issue: 1 Pages: 119-137

    • DOI

      10.1111/roie.12444

    • Related Report
      2019 Annual Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Journal Article] 差別化複占下での技術選択2019

    • Author(s)
      大川隆夫・岡村誠・野村良一
    • Journal Title

      国際貿易理論の現代的諸課題(中京大学経済研究所研究叢書)

      Volume: 26 Pages: 137-150

    • Related Report
      2018 Research-status Report
  • [Journal Article] Aggregative game における参入の非効率性に関するノート2018

    • Author(s)
      大川隆夫、岡村誠
    • Journal Title

      経済論叢(京都大学経済学会 編)

      Volume: 192 Pages: 53-59

    • Related Report
      2018 Research-status Report
  • [Journal Article] A Composite Government Model with Intragovernmental Competition: A Trade and Industrial Policy Game2018

    • Author(s)
      Masayuki Hayashibara, Ryoichi Nomura, Takao Ohkawa, and Makoto Okamura
    • Journal Title

      Discussion Paper Series, Faculty of Economics, Ritsumeikan University

      Volume: 18002 Pages: 1-34

    • Related Report
      2018 Research-status Report
  • [Journal Article] On the Incentive for a Self-Interested Policymaker to Mimic the Behavior of a Social-Welfare Maximizer2018

    • Author(s)
      Masayuki Hayashibara, Takao Ohkawa, Ryoichi Nomura, and Makoto Okamura
    • Journal Title

      Recent Developments in Normative Trade Theory and Welfare Economics (eds by Tran-Nam, Binh, Tawada, Makoto, Okawa, Masayuki )

      Volume: Ch.10 Pages: 155-168

    • DOI

      10.1007/978-981-10-8615-1_10

    • ISBN
      9789811086144, 9789811086151
    • Related Report
      2017 Research-status Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Journal Article] Countervailing Duties Occur in Equilibrium2018

    • Author(s)
      Masayuki Hayashibara, Takao Ohkawa, Ryoichi Nomura, and Makoto Okamura
    • Journal Title

      Discussion Paper Series, Faculty of Economics, Ritsumeikan University

      Volume: 17003 Pages: 1-29

    • Related Report
      2017 Research-status Report
  • [Journal Article] INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE-CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE-ENTRY OLIGOPOLY2017

    • Author(s)
      HAMADA Kojun、OHKAWA Takao、OKAMURA Makoto
    • Journal Title

      Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics

      Volume: 89 Issue: 2 Pages: 437-448

    • DOI

      10.1111/apce.12179

    • Related Report
      2017 Research-status Report
    • Peer Reviewed / Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
  • [Presentation] Effect of Bilateral Free Trade Agreement on Technology Choice2019

    • Author(s)
      R. Nomura
    • Organizer
      ERSA 59th Congress (Lyon, France)
    • Related Report
      2019 Annual Research Report
    • Int'l Joint Research

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Published: 2017-04-28   Modified: 2021-02-19  

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