Trade and Industrial Policies under intra-governmental and inter-governmental competition
| Project/Area Number |
17K03734
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Ritsumeikan University |
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Principal Investigator |
Ohkawa Takao 立命館大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10258494)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
林原 正之 追手門学院大学, 経済学部, 名誉教授 (00104901)
野村 良一 立命館大学, 経済学部, 教授 (60465599)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2017-04-01 – 2020-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2019)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,640,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥840,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
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| Keywords | 政府内競争 / 関税 / 補助金 / 貿易政策 / 産業政策 / サイロ効果 / 縦割り行政 / 私益 / 目的関数 / 公益 / 政府間競争 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We consider the domestic government is self-interested and compounded. It consists of a subsidy department and a tariff department. The former (The latter) non-cooperatively sets its subsidy (tariff) rate to the producer surplus (the tariff revenue). We establish: The welfare level in the non-cooperative equilibrium is higher than that in the cooperative one. We also develop a delegation game in which each department's minister delegates policy decision-making to policy-makers, and obtain: In the delegation equilibrium, both the producer surplus and tariff revenue increase, but both the consumer surplus and national welfare decline compared with the equilibrium without delegation. Furthermore, we construct the model where the government consists of the above two agencies and coordination agency, determining the degree of coordination in response to the types of the government. We establish: No coordination is desirable for both benevolent and consumer-oriented governments.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
政府の各部門が自分の事だけ考えて行動する「サイロ(縦割り行政)」を、政府内競争と定義し、「サイロ」が解消された状況を政府内の協調と考える。一般通念では、「サイロ」を解消した方が望ましいと考えられるが、外国企業に関税をかけ、自国企業に補助金を給付している状況を前提にした場合、「サイロ」が解消されない方が望ましいということが判明した。しかも、各部門が私益を追求し、各部門にサイロの解消が委ねられた場合には、両部門が部分的に「サイロ」を解消しようとすることがありうることもわかった。両部門の調整役が、「サイロ」を解消できる場合、自国の産業保護を優先にする政府ならば、サイロを解消することもわかった。
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(9 results)
