| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,420,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,020,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
|
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This paper analytically investigates the relationship between tax avoidance and manager's disclosure choice of geographic earnings in a capital market setting. In particular, we identify the conditions under which managers withhold segment earnings and avoid tax payment by shifting income from high-tax to low-tax country.
Our analysis shows the following results. When the countries have the same tax rate, the manager rationally withholds segment earnings in spite of the fact that there is no tax-avoidance incentive for the managers. After the adoption of SFAS 131, the companies that face high precision of earnings in high tax country withholds segment earnings and increase the level of tax avoidance. Imposing CbCR may induce the companies to voluntarily disclose their segment earnings. Regarding the dynamic aspects, the manager engages more in tax-avoidance activity immediately after the turnover.
|
