| Project/Area Number |
17K13694
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
International relations
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| Research Institution | University of Niigata Prefecture (2021-2022)
Waseda University (2017-2020) |
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Principal Investigator |
Hirose Kentaro 新潟県立大学, 国際地域学部, 准教授 (90764738)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2017-04-01 – 2023-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2022)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥390,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥90,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
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| Keywords | 強制外交 / 非強制外交 / パワー / 外交 / 戦争 / パワーの分布 / 自発的交換 / サイドペイメント / 政策代替性 / 軍事紛争 / 同盟 / 経済援助 / 政治学 / 国際政治学 / 外交論 / 紛争研究 / 平和研究 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Conventional international politics has held that a state is more likely to use coercive diplomacy, which involves the threat to use force, as its power increases. However, this idea assumes that the state faces the choice between “coercive diplomacy” and “do nothing,” abstracting the possibility of noncoercive diplomacy, which does not involve coercive threats. This study used game theory to logically demonstrate that the use of coercive diplomacy can undermine trust of other countries, that non-coercive diplomacy can be used to avoid this reputational damage, and that this diplomatic substitution is expected to reduce the probability that a great power would use coercive diplomacy. Statistical analysis of data on the threat of force, economic aid, and arms transfers confirmed the validity of the hypothesis.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
本研究は外交に関する既存の考えを変えるだけでない。それは戦争の条件に関する学術的に重要な問い(なぜ非対称的なパワー分布において戦争の確率が最小化されるのか)に対しても今までの考えとは異なる答えを提示する。また強大国による強制権力の使用をいかに抑制するかという社会的にも重要な問いにも答える。
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