Farsighted Stability in Generalized Matching Problems

• Project/Area Number: 17K13696
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Tokyo Institute of Technology
• Principal Investigator: Kawasaki Ryo 東京工業大学, 工学院, 准教授 (20579619)
• Project Period (FY): 2017-04-01 – 2020-03-31
• Project Status: Completed (Fiscal Year 2019)
• Budget Amount: ¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000); Fiscal Year 2019: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000); Fiscal Year 2018: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000); Fiscal Year 2017: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
• Keywords: 一般化マッチング / 先見性 / 安定性 / 競争均衡 / 非分割財市場 / 極小性 / 先見的安定集合 / 非分割材市場 / マッチング / 一般化マッチング問題

Outline of Final Research Achievements

This research investigates the generalized matching problem with farsighted agents. The generalized matching problem includes as its special case the two-sided matching problem and the indivisible good (house) barter game. These models can be obtained by restricting the matchings that can be formed. It is shown through this research that these rules have significant impacts on the matchings that may result with farsighted agents.

Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements

マッチング問題や非分割財の物々交換モデルは，様々な労働市場に応用例があるが，殆どの理論分析においては，想定しているプレイヤーは先見性を全く持っていない．本研究では，より一般的なモデルを分析する上で，それぞれのモデルに課されているルールがどのように影響するかを分析しており，先見性を持つプレイヤーに関する研究に対し，新たな側面での研究を行っている．また，現実におけるマッチング問題にも既存の理論モデルでは想定していない制約も存在し得るが，一般化マッチング問題を分析する上でもこのような制約も考慮できることになり，マッチング理論の観点からも重要な研究である．

Research Products

• [Int'l Joint Research] Boston College(米国)
• [Journal Article] Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) (2018)
  • Author(s): Kawasaki Ryo、Wako Jun、Muto Shigeo
  • Journal Title: Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science Volume: - Pages: 1-41
  • DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_99-3
  • ISBN: 9783642277375
  • Peer Reviewed / Open Access
• [Journal Article] Equilibria in Bottleneck Games (2018)
  • Author(s): Ryo Kawasaki, Hideo Konishi, Junki Yukawa
  • Journal Title: Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics Working Paper No. 2018-1, Tokyo Institute of Technology Volume: - Pages: 1-18
  • Open Access / Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] von Neumann and Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets of Assignment Games (2019)
  • Author(s): Ryo Kawasaki and Tomohiro Matsuse
  • Organizer: European Meeting on Game Theory (SING 15)
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] Weak versus Strong Indirect Domination in the Shapley-Scarf Economy (2018)
  • Author(s): Ryo Kawasaki
  • Organizer: 14th European Meeting on Game Theory 2018 (SING14)
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] A Finite Bottleneck Game with Homogeneous Commuters (2018)
  • Author(s): Junki Yukawa
  • Organizer: ゲーム理論ワークショップ２０１８
• [Presentation] Weak versus Strong Indirect Domination in the Shapley-Scarf Economy (2018)
  • Author(s): Ryo Kawasaki
  • Organizer: ゲーム理論ワークショップ２０１８
• [Presentation] A Finite Bottleneck Game with Homogeneous Commuters (2017)
  • Author(s): Junki Yukawa
  • Organizer: Eleventh International Conference on Game Theory and Management
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] A Finite Bottleneck Game with Homogeneous Commuters (2017)
  • Author(s): Junki Yukawa
  • Organizer: 13th European Meeting on Game Theory (SING13)
  • Int'l Joint Research
• [Presentation] A Finite Bottleneck Game with Homogeneous Commuters (2017)
  • Author(s): Junki Yukawa
  • Organizer: East Asian Game Theory Conference 2017
  • Int'l Joint Research