| Project/Area Number |
17K13707
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Waseda University |
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Principal Investigator |
Liu Shuige 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 講師(任期付) (80779083)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2017-04-01 – 2020-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2019)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,120,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥720,000)
Fiscal Year 2019: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2018: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2017: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | game theory / epistemic game theory / algorithmic game theory / proof theory / coalition formation / cooperative game theory / extensive form / logic / 経済理論 / ゲーム理論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
1. Graphical structure and stable behavior. I introduced a directed graphical structure which indicates who influence who and characterized the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. 2. Reasoning structures. I defined the lexicographic epistemic model and characterized permissibility, admissibility, and proper rationalizability in incomplete information. 3. Coalition formation. A notion called monotonic core allocation path was introduced. Its reveals an essential conflict between fairness and dynamic stableness. 4. Cooperative games’ epistemic foundation. I characterized the core in terms of knowledge. It unfolded an inconsistency behind classical results: increasing replicas leaves knowledge in a competitive market intact while requires unbounded epistemic ability in a cooperative game. 5. Chronological order of a game. I reduced extensive forms to the ones with simultaneous moves. It preserves the information and the order of plays, which is vital in dynamic reasoning.
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| Academic Significance and Societal Importance of the Research Achievements |
Only hierarchies guarantee stability. Incomplete information equals to distrusting others’ rationality. Coalition forming cannot be both stable and fair. Institutes arise from limit rationality and evolution. They revealed a gap between reality and theories, an alarm for sciences and policymaking.
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